In the context of Military Operations, we are comfortable in referring to a joint model. However, to understand the real significance of Multi Domain Operations, we first need to understand the paradigm shift, which distinguishes these operations from traditional joint operations. Joint operations are based on the need to achieve superiority in the domain of competence. Alternatively, the essence of Multi Domain Operations in the awareness that it is not possible to maintain supremacy in all domains. Therefore, their goal is to maintain freedom of movement in all domains to exploit any opportunity by taking advantage by the convergence of effects to be achieved through the synchronization of cross-domain actions. Carrying out Cyberspace Operations is actually a powerful enabler as an “effect” contribution to multi-domain operations. So, Cyberspace Operations should be addressed to these cross-domain purposes and better support the chain of command with increased situational awareness. Currently it is possible to identify a series of assets, capabilities and activities that rely on cyberspace. Technologies and systems like radar sensors or logistic information platforms are critical to military operations. Most of the CNI8, such as power grids or fuel pipelines, are controlled and supervised by specific hardware and software also called ICS9. Furthermore, substantial amounts of data are exchanged daily through human interactions by mean of digital tools are essential for development, commerce and services to citizens. All those mentioned technologies, assets and capabilities could be possible targets for effects like denial services, data exfiltration, data manipulation and, in general, actions that could influence public opinion or, even worst, political decisions. Therefore, those assets and capabilities, if friendly, must be defended and in case they are enemy assets, they could be exploited. Cyberspace Operations can be split in operations that are carried out inside the boundaries of an internal infrastructure and operations that are carried beyond those boundaries (see picture 2). Hence, we identify the “Blue Cyberspace” where to conduct proactive DCO10 and guarantee Info Assurance trough the CISIO11 and the “Red Cyberspace” where to conduct reactive DCO without excluding the possibility to conduct OCO12 with the aim to generate specific effects and to reach the desired end-state.